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THE APPLICATION OF
A DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT
TO MARKET SHARE THEORY
IN DES LITIGATION
Between 1947 and 1971, doctors frequently prescribed diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) as a miscarriage preventative.' Experts esti-
mate that 500,000 to 2,000,000 pregnant women used the drug
during this period of time.2 In 1971, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) prohibited the sale of DES for use by pregnant
women because the Agency determined that DES could cause
cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in females exposed to the
drug in utero. These cancers and related problems manifest
themselves after a minimum latency period of ten to twelve
years.'
At present there are approximately 1,000 DES suits pending
in the courts." The plaintiffs in these cases are the daughters of
women who took DES, and the defendants are generally the ma-
jor drug companies that marketed DES. 5
Identifying the proper defendant in DES cases creates a major
problem. 6 Under traditional tort theory, the plaintiff must estab-
1. Roberts & Royster, DES and the Identification Problem, 16 AKRON L. REV. 447,
453 (1983). The Food and Drug Administration originally approved the drug for use for
this purpose in 1947. Id. at 452.
2. Id. at 453.
3. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). With regard to the potential impact of
DES on men exposed to it in utero, "[tihere have been some reports of non-cancerous
abnormalities of DES exposed sons, but, it does not appear that there is any cancer
risk." Roberts & Royster, supra note 1, at 454 (citation omitted).
4. Roberts & Royster, supra note 1, at 455.
5. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 593, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Five of the major companies are Abbott
Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., Rexall Drug Co. (now part of Dart Industries), E.R. Squibb
& Sons, and the Upjohn Company. See Comment, Market Share Liability: Is California
a Mere Gadfly on the Products Liability Scene or Is It a Harbinger of a National
Trend?, 11 Orno N.U.L. REV. 129, 131 n.21 (1984).
6. The plaintiffs have generally not had difficulty in establishing the other elements
of a suit in negligence, which is what they must establish in order to recover for a drug-
related injury. See Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation
Problem, 94 HsAv. L. REv. 668, 669-70 (1981).
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lish that the defendant's actions caused her injury.7 The DES
plaintiffs, however, claim that they cannot identify what type of
DES was ingested because doctors often prescribed it generi-
cally,8 pharmacists often filled prescriptions from whatever stock
they had on hand, and the mothers of DES victims have often
forgotten the physical characteristics of the pills they took.' In
addition, medical and pharmaceutical records may have been
lost or destroyed, and witnesses may have died in the years be-
tween in utero exposure and the manifestation of injury.10 Thus,
the traditional requirement that the plaintiff identify the de-
fendant who caused her injury has not been satisfied in numer-
ous cases.1
In 1980, the California Supreme Court examined the DES
problem in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.2 Although the
Sindell court rejected plaintiffs' attempts to relax the traditional
identification requirement, the court did fashion a new theory,
called market share theory. Under this theory a plaintiff can ob-
tain damages from a given manufacturer in proportion to that
manufacturer's share of the relevant market when the drug was
being sold." Instead of predicating liability on the identification
of a specific defendant, market share theory assigns damages ac-
cording to the market share percentage of each manufacturer
sued by the plaintiff at the time the plaintiff purchased the
medication. 4
Market share theory has been met with mixed reactions by
courts in other jurisdictions. Courts rejecting the theory have
generally done so because the theory eliminates the traditional
7. 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.03 (1983); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D § 1:41 (2d ed. 1974); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §
103 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
8. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 180, 342 N.W.2d 37, 44, cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
9. Id. at 181, 342 N.W.2d at 44.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978).
12. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
13. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. As simple as
that may have sounded in Sindell, the practical difficulties involved in determining dif-
ferent companies' market shares have been so great that one California court has deter-
mined it is not possible to do. See Reporters' Daily Transcript of Proceedings at 3784
(Oct. 11, 1985), Stapp v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-344-407 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 16,
1985): "Commentators use these nice-sounding percentages without any basis in fact.
Now, when you are sitting in the ivory halls of academia, you can select 80 percent, or 60
percent, or 40 percent; and you can use these nice round, beautiful figures. But that's not
the real world."
14. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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identification requirement. These courts fear that once the iden-
tification requirement is omitted from a cause of action, plain-
tiffs will be able to sue whomever they desire without regard to
actual culpability.1"
In response to the identification problem, a federal judge pre-
siding over numerous DES cases in Massachusetts approved the
use of market share theory, but imposed as a prerequisite for its
use a showing by the plaintiffs that they had been "duly dili-
gent" in attempting to identify the individual manufacturer of
the DES which had injured them."6 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs should undertake their own investigation before the
burden shifted to the defendants to exculpate themselves.
This Note argues that courts should impose a due diligence
requirement on plaintiffs as a prerequisite to the use of market
share theory. Part I examines traditional products liability theo-
ries along with alternative theories and explains the relationship
of due diligence to market share theory. Part II argues that due
diligence should be a prerequisite to market share liability. Part
III discusses the nature of due diligence in this context. Finally,
15. See Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332, 334-35 (D.D.C. 1982) (question of
causation left to speculation and guesswork); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F.
Supp. 593, 599-600 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (Florida will not abandon element of causation);
Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 186-91 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (Georgia
tort law does not allow market share liability; it would render every manufacturer an
insurer of both his own products and generic products manufactured by competitors);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (D.S.C. 1981) (application of this bur-
den-shifting theory would violate established public policy and fundamental principles of
tort law); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246-47 (Mo. 1984) (to shift the burden
of causation would substantially alter existing rights and liabilities of the litigants); see
also Comment, supra note 5, at 143-44 & nn.116-18. But cf. Martin v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (combination of market share and alternative
liability adopted because all of the manufacturers created the same risk that was im-
posed upon all the plaintiffs); McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D.
Mass. 1985) (adopting Martin); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D.
1983) (plaintiff relieved of specific identification burden, with court citing policy argu-
ments advanced in Sindell); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164
(altering alternative liability for DES cases so as to resemble market share), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 123 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (combi-
nation of market share and alternative liability based on state's comparative negligence
statute), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
16. Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D.
Mass. filed 1976). For its market share theory, the court followed Martin v. Abbott Labo-
ratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984), whose significance in terms of market
share theory and due diligence is discussed infra text accompanying notes 70-75; see also
Memorandum Concerning Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) as
Applied to the Garfinkle Trial (May 22, 1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice
Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum
Concerning Martin v. Abbott Laboratories]. For a discussion of the origins of the appli-
cation of due diligence in this manner, see infra text accompanying notes 56-60.
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Part IV considers various objections to a due diligence require-
ment and argues that they are essentially without merit.
I. MARKET SHARE THEORY, DUE DILIGENCE, AND ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The plaintiffs in DES cases have had difficulty demonstrating
specific causation in order to recover under traditional tort the-
ory.17 In addition, such burden-shifting theories as alternative
liability, enterprise liability, and concert of action have been
shown to be unsuitable to DES cases.18 Market share theory, or
substantially modified versions of it, has therefore developed as
an alternative method in some jurisdictions. 9 Because of its re-
laxation of the traditional identification requirement, however,
one court has required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that they
have been duly diligent in attempting to identify the individual
tortfeasor before the court allows the plaintiffs to use market
share theory.
A. Traditional Identification Theory
Traditional products liability law requires a demonstration by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the
injuries for which the plaintiff seeks damages.20 The plaintiff
must typically show that his or her injuries were caused by an
act of the defendant or by an instrumentality under the defend-
ant's control.21 As discussed above, several factors have made
such a showing more difficult for plaintiffs in DES litigation
than for plaintiffs in traditional tort cases.2 2 Thus, many plain-
tiffs have found it difficult to identify the particular defendant
that made the pill that caused their injuries and have faced the
possibility of recovering no damages.
17. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-44.
19. See supra note 15.
20. See supra note 7.
21. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 103, at 712-13.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
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B. Alternative Theories
Plaintiffs have unsuccessfully advanced several liability theo-
ries to deal with the identification problem. One of these theo-
ries is known as "concert of action," according to which a de-
fendant may be held liable for the actions of another if he acts
tortiously in a common design with the other.2 s Because the de-
fendants acted together in creating the hazard that injured the
plaintiff, each of them is considered individually liable.24
The primary difficulty in applying concert of action to the
DES cases is demonstrating a sufficient agreement among the
defendants. 5 Because of the absence of any explicit agreement,
plaintiffs must show an implicit agreement from the parallel
conduct of testing and promoting DES.26 However, reliance
upon a competitor's marketing and testing is a prevalent and
acceptable business practice, not tortious group conduct.2 7 Be-
cause of the manner in which companies in the same industry
share aspects of their manufacturing and marketing operations,
courts have noted that to apply concert of action to manufactur-
ing situations could render virtually any manufacturer liable for
the defective products of an entire industry, even if that manu-
facturer could prove it did not manufacture the injurious sub-
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979). The Restatement also provides
two other possibilities:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
Id. at § 876(b)-(c).
The classical application of concert of action has been its use in assigning liability to a
group of drag racers whose race caused the plaintiff injuries. See Agovino v. Kunze, 181
Cal. App. 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960).
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 46, at 322-23.
25. See Note, supra note 6, at 671. The concerted action typically alleged by plain-
tiffs in DES cases consists in part of manufacturers sharing marketing techniques and
using an agreed upon formula for their DES to enhance its marketability as a generic
drug. Id. at 670-71 n.18.
26. Id. at 670-71 n.18. With regard to concert of action, Prosser notes that "[e]xpress
agreement is not necessary and all that is required is that there be a tacit understand-
ing." W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 46, at 323.
27. Comment, supra note 5, at 135. "Moreover, [in Sindell] there was no basis for
finding either that each defendant knew other defendants were acting tortiously toward
the plaintiff or that they assisted or encouraged one-another to test DES inadequately."
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stance.28 Thus, concert of action is not a suitable solution to the
DES problem.
The courts have also considered and rejected the theory of in-
dustry-wide or "enterprise" liability. Enterprise liability holds
defendants liable for sharing in industry-wide misconduct.2 9 The
theory is based on Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,30 in
which the court held the plaintiffs had a cause of action against
the blasting cap industry whose products had exploded and
caused injuries. 31 Reasoning that the defendants had adhered to
an industry-wide standard with regard to the safety features of
blasting caps, that they had delegated some safety functions to
their trade association, and that there had been industry-wide
cooperation in the manufacture and design of the caps, the court
held that the defendants jointly controlled the risk.32 The Hall
court expressly cautioned against applying this doctrine to in-
dustries with a large number of manufacturers.33 It based its
conclusion primarily on the companies' delegation of some of the
functions relating to safety to a trade association. 4 Enterprise
liability is thus not suitable to the DES problem because the
DES industry did not delegate any safety functions to a trade
28. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 606, 607 P.2d 924, 933,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
29. See Note, supra note 6, at 671; see also Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory
of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978). This work discusses the theory
of enterprise liability in the context of the DES cases and proposes seven requirements
for establishing a cause of action:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent and
such liability is due to the nature of the defendants' conduct.
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the
defendants.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused by
the product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants
accounted for a high percentage of such defective products on the market at the
time of plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industrywide standard of safety as to the manu-
facture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whichever
cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict liability.
Id. at 995; see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608 n.24, 607 P.2d 924,
935 n.24, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 143 n.24, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
30. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
31. The explosion of the blasting caps, having destroyed any potential evidence, had
made identification of the specific manufacturer impossible.
32. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 373-74, 378.




association, and the requisite degree of industry-wide coopera-
tion among the numerous manufacturers is lacking.-5
The most promising theory for the DES problem, advanced
prior to market share theory, was that of "alternative liability."
A plaintiff employs this theory when she is injured by one of two
or more possible defendants and is unable, through no fault of
her own, to identify which of the defendants was negligent.3 6 In
a celebrated case discussing this theory, Summers v. Tice,3 7 two
hunters negligently shot in the direction of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff could not prove which of the two hunters had fired the
shot that seriously injured him. Thus, the Summers court, to
prevent an innocent victim from assuming the expenses of dam-
ages caused by negligent defendants, held the hunters jointly
and severally liable for the harm to the plaintiff.38 Under this
theory, the burden shifts to the defendants to exonerate them-
selves because they are typically in a better position than the
plaintiff to determine which of them was negligent.3 9 An impor-
tant assumption of alternative liability theory is that all of the
possible defendants have been brought into the suit, for unless
this is the case, the guilty party may not be before the court.4
One difficulty with applying alternative liability to the DES
cases has been bringing in all of the defendants to a suit. Ap-
proximately 300 drug companies manufactured DES.41 Because
the sale of DES took place many years ago and some manufac-
turers have since gone out of business,42 it is possible that in any
35. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 934, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 142, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The fact that nearly 300 companies
marketed a chemically identical formula resulted in part from the FDA's role in develop-
ing the common formula. In fact, another major reason the Sindell court rejected enter-
prise liability is that the drug industry is closely regulated by the FDA, so the standards
followed by drug manufacturers are suggested or compelled by the government:
[S]ince the government plays such a pervasive role in formulating the criteria for
the testing and marketing of drugs, it would be unfair to impose upon a manu-
facturer liability for injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not
supply simply because it followed the standards of the industry.
Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143 (footnotes and citations omitted).
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 4. This doctrine has also been incorporated into the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965):
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm
has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as
to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he
has not caused the harm.
37. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
38. Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4.
39. Id.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, comment h (1965).
41. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 603, 689 P.2d 368, 381 (1984).
42. Note, supra note 6, at 672.
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given case none of the named defendants manufactured the DES
ingested by the plaintiff's mother. Thus, the courts have consid-
ered it unfair to require each defendant to exonerate itself. In
addition, alternative liability provides no way to apportion lia-
bility among manufacturers, meaning that defendants with
widely varying shares of the market are equally liable.4 3 As for-
mulated prior to SindeUl, alternative liability is not a plausible
solution to the DES problem."
C. Market Share Theory
To deal with the plaintiffs' inability to recover using estab-
lished principles of tort law, the California Supreme Court, in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,"5 created a modified version of
alternative liability. It eliminated the specific causation require-
ment and instead assessed liability as a function of market
share. Reasoning that in a complex industrialized society fungi-
ble goods that are not traceable to their manufacturer often
harm consumers, the Sindell court argued that it would be bet-
ter to fashion new remedies for changing needs, rather than to
adhere rigidly to established doctrine.4 6 Because defendants are
better able to bear the cost of injuries and because plaintiffs are
not at fault for failing to provide evidence of causation, the court
held that it is "reasonable... to measure the likelihood that any
of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured
plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of them
for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire
production of the drug sold by all for that purpose."47 To em-
ploy the Sindell theory, a plaintiff initially alleges only that a
manufacturer held a "substantial percentage" of the relevant
DES market. The burden then shifts to the manufacturer to
demonstrate that it could not have produced the DES ingested
by the plaintiff's mother."' The end result, according to Sindell,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 671-72.
45. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
46. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
47. Id. at 611-612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
48. Id. The reasoning of the Sindell court in allowing exculpation by defendants was
to retain one aspect of the identification requirement: if the defendant can prove it did
not cause the injury, the defendant should not have to pay. Permitting this form of ex-
culpation might appear to contradict the premise of market share theory that, while one
defendant may pay for damages caused by another in one case, that will be balanced out
by the defendant who originally escaped liability paying in other cases, with percentages
[VOL. 19:3
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is that each manufacturer's liability approximates its responsi-
bility for the injuries caused by its products.49
Although different state courts have used various refined
forms of this market share theory,50 perceived problems with the
theory have prevented many courts from accepting it. The major
objection to the theory is that it eliminates the burden of proof
traditionally placed on the plaintiff to identify the individual
tortfeasor.5 1 This problem has been sufficiently significant to
lead to a good deal of controversy regarding market share
theory."'
One example of a negative reaction is the opinion of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Payton v. Abbott
Labs.8 In Payton the court denied plaintiffs a cause of action
under market share theory, expressing disapproval of the elimi-
nation of the identification requirement. 4 Yet the court noted at
the end of its opinion that on an "adequate record" it might
recognize some relaxation of the traditional identification re-
quirement in appropriate circumstances. 55
of market shares providing reasonable approximations of total liability. That the Sindell
court made exculpation an important part of market share theory demonstrates that the
court only intended it to be used when other theories could not be used. See infra text
accompanying notes 61-62. In addition, for the implications of allowing exculpation in
market share theory in terms of the due diligence requirement, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 100-04.
The Sindell court assumed the only way to show that a company did not supply the
DES which injured the plaintiff would be to show it did not market the drug in the
geographic area in which the plaintiff lived or that it did not sell the drug for the pur-
pose of preventing miscarriages. Exculpation, however, has become a complex part of
market share. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 592-93, 689 P.2d
368, 376 (1984) (citing Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305
(Law Div. 1980)); see also infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
49. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
50. See supra note 15.
51. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson,
J., dissenting) ("An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or
for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between
the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.")
(quoting W. PROSSER. supra note 7, § 41, at 236) (emphasis omitted).
52. For positive reviews of market share theory, see Note, supra note 6; Note, Market
Share Liability for Injurious Products: A Comment on Sindell, 41 U. TORONTO FAc. L.
REv. 52 (1983); Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litigation:
The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. Rv. 609 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Overcoming the Identification Burden]. But cf. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analy-
sis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981); Comment, Market Share
Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identifica-
tion, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 300 (1981). For examples of mixed court reactions, see supra note
15.
53. 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
54. Id. at 573, 437 N.E.2d at 189.
55. Id. at 574, 437 N.E.2d at 190. The Payton court stated in full that it might allow
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D. The Due Diligence Requirement
In response to Payton, a federal judge presiding over a large
number of DES cases in Massachusetts applied market share
theory, but also imposed an additional requirement upon the
plaintiffs. Prior to their use of market share theory, the court
held, plaintiffs must make a showing of "due diligence" with re-
spect to their attempts to identify the individual tortfeasor
whose DES harmed the plaintiff.5 6 Thus, the plaintiff's failure to
identify the specific DES manufacturer had to be the result of a
reasonable but unsuccessful effort to determine the identity of
the tortfeasor51 This due diligence requirement resulted in a
summary judgment for the defendant in one such Massachusetts
case because the plaintiff failed to show the requisite degree of
due diligence, as determined by the court in a pretrial hearing.58
Due diligence with regard to identification efforts had been pre-
viously applied to DES cases only once. In Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co.," the Michigan Supreme Court held that DES plaintiffs
must make a genuine attempt to locate and identify the respon-
sible tortfeasor before they could rely on a modified version of
alternative liability against the defendants. The genuineness of
the attempt, according to Abel, should be measured by the
traditional due diligence standard, and it is the trial court's duty
to determine whether this standard has been met.60
"some relaxation of the traditional identification requirement in appropriate circum-
stances so as to allow recovery against a negligent defendant of that portion of a plain-
tiff's damages which is represented by that defendant's contribution of DES to the mar-
ket in the relevant period of time." Id. The court declined to elaborate further on what
might be an adequate record or appropriate circumstances. In summarizing its views
later in the opinion, the court indicated that it "might permit recovery from those de-
fendants shown to be negligent to the extent of their participation in the DES market,
even though the plaintiffs cannot identify the particular source of DES which their
mothers ingested." Id. at 575, 437 N.E.2d at 190.
56. The district judge, while considering what the Payton court would consider an
"adequate record," saw identification evidence being produced by Eli Lilly & Co. at one
trial, Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Andrea Goldstein, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed
1976). See infra note 86. Believing that more of this type of evidence existed and would
become important, the court imposed the requirement of due diligence. See Hearing on
Due Diligence at 5, 3-79 (May 28-30, 1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice
Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on
Due Diligence].
57. See Memorandum of Defendant The Upjohn Company on Plaintiff's Due Dili-
gence Requirement at 4-5 (May 28, 1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice Cohen
Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of
Upjohn on Due Diligence].
58. Hearing on Due Diligence, supra note 56, at 3-113, 3-114.
59. 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 123 (1984).
60. Id. at 332, 343 N.W.2d at 173.
Market Share Theory
II. REASONS FOR IMPOSING THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT
A due diligence requirement should be applied to the theory
of market share liability for two reasons. First, an investigation
by the plaintiffs is implicitly presupposed by market share. Sec-
ond, the due diligence requirement provides the plaintiff with an
incentive to investigate that would otherwise be lacking. Because
the plaintiff is initially in a better position than the defendant to
conduct such an investigation, the requirement enhances the ef-
ficiency of the discovery process.
A. Due Diligence Is Presupposed in Market Share Cases
One reason for imposing the due diligence requirement is that
it is a basic assumption of market share theory that the plaintiff
is generally unable, with a reasonable effort, to identify the man-
ufacturer of the DES to which she was exposed. It is a theory of
last resort, adopted only because courts generally could not ap-
ply traditional theories of tort law to the DES litigation." As
one defendant argued, "Plaintiff here is seeking a radical change
in existing law: the relaxation or elimination of the requirement
that a plaintiff identify the manufacturer of the product which
injured her. At a minimum, she has the burden of establishing
that such relief from existing law is justified. ' '6 2
Thus, the very nature of a market share case presupposes that
the plaintiff has made a diligent effort to identify the wrongdoer
and has failed. To impose the requirement of due diligence is
only to require explicitly what is already implicit in a market
share case. Unless this assumption is made explicit, however,
courts may lose sight of the fact that market share is a theory of
61. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 596, 607 P.2d 924, 926, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 ("[Tjhe trial court sustained the demurrers of these defendants ...
on the ground that plaintiff did not and stated she could not identify which defendant
had manufactured the drug responsible for her injuries."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). Thus, the Sindell court based its theory on the presupposition that the plaintiff
had made some sort of identification effort which had failed. Accord Abel v. Eli Lilli &
Co., 418 Mich. 311, 337, 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 ("Only when traditional concepts fail to
meet the demands which are placed upon them must novel responses develop to fill the
void and answer society's need for equitable loss distribution."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
123 (1984).
62. Memorandum of Defendant Eli Lilly and Company on Plaintiff's Due Diligence
Requirement at 2 (May 28, 1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice Cohen Garfin-
kle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Eli Lilly
on Due Diligence].
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last resort. In addition, were the plaintiff relieved of her normal
burden of identification and no substitute made for the burden,
many courts may conclude the theory is unacceptable.
B. Without Due Diligence, Plaintiffs Have Little Incentive
to Look for Identification Evidence
A further reason for imposing the due diligence requirement is
to provide plaintiffs with an incentive to search for identification
evidence. As discussed above, market share theory is a theory of
last resort, and it is therefore desirable to determine, if possible,
which defendant actually caused the plaintiff's harm.63 Thus, the
law should encourage investigation to determine the proper
defendant.
In DES litigation, the plaintiff can undertake the initial inves-
tigation more efficiently because she is initially in a better posi-
tion to determine which defendant is liable. If the plaintiff's
mother is available," she can provide her daughter with a
description of the DES she took, as well as the name of the
pharmacy where the DES was obtained and the name of the
physician who prescribed it. The plaintiff can then use this in-
formation immediately to investigate further. In contrast, the
defendants' access to this information must await the formal
discovery process.es
63. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. This idea might seem contrary to the
philosophy of market share. Some proponents of market share theory have argued that
all of these identification efforts should be abandoned and all plaintiffs should be al-
lowed the use of market share. This suggestion, however, is a far more radical change
from traditional tort law than the authors of Sindell ever contemplated, and few, if any,
state courts would accept it. See generally infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
64. "[Tlhere may be situations where a plaintiff, confronted with estrangement from
her family or the death of her mother, will be unable to satisfy a court that she has
genuinely attempted to locate the manufacturer." McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories,
617 F. Supp. 1521, 1529 (D. Mass. 1985). If this is the case, however, the court could
easily take that factor into account in determining whether the plaintiff has made a rea-
sonable effort. Indeed, the definition of due diligence emphasizes the facts of the individ-
ual situation. See infra note 76.
65. Memorandum of Upjohn on Due Diligence, supra note 57, at 8-9. To some extent,
the defendants in DES cases have much more knowledge regarding identification infor-
mation, such as information about pharmacies, pharmacy practices, and drug distribu-
tion. Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Trial Issues Regarding Pharmacy Market Share and
Alternative Liability at 11 (Nov. 13, 1984), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Andrea
Goldstein, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum on Trial Issues]. However, in general, the nature of the DES litigation contrasts to
the situations in which plaintiffs try to use alternative liability, concert of action, and
enterprise liability. In these situations the defendants are much more apt to have access
to information which would determine who might be liable, and the courts apply the
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Unless the due diligence requirement is imposed, however, a
plaintiff in a DES case to which market share theory is applied
will have little or no reason to conduct a search. Without the
due diligence requirement, she is not required to identify the de-
fendant who produced her mother's medication. In addition, be-
cause the DES industry consisted at one point of over 300 man-
ufacturers,66 many of whom may now be bankrupt or low on
funds and difficult to sue, a plaintiff might be tempted to remain
silent in the face of evidence that the maker of her DES is not
one of the major companies .1
As one defendant argued, the due diligence requirement
"serves the same purpose as a statute of limitations does: it pre-
vents destruction of evidence which may have existed at the
time of injury and it does not permit plaintiff to wait until her
claim becomes stale before divulging essential information which
only she has."68 The due diligence requirement, then, provides
the plaintiffs with the necessary incentive to investigate and
thus enhances the efficiency of the investigative process.
In McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories,"9 however, the court
refused to apply the due diligence requirement, partly because it
rejected the arguments discussed above. The court adopted a
version of market share theory according to which a plaintiff
might not recover her entire verdict, but only a reduced percent-
age of it.10 The court reasoned that the possibility of this recov-
burden-shifting theories in part because of this fact. See supra text accompanying notes
23-44.
66. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
67. See Fischer, supra note 52, at 1649-50; Overcoming the Identification Burden,
supra note 52, at 636; see also Order Granting Default Judgment at 2, Collins-Gastrow v.
Eli Lilly Co. (Wis. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1986). In Collins-Gastrow the court granted default
judgment against 30 companies which had manufactured DES and which were made
third-party defendants in one suit. Because these companies did not respond to service
of process, they were probably out of business.
In addition to the problem of companies being out of business or bankrupt, the law
concerning successor liability has prevented recovery when plaintiffs sue a corporation
that has acquired a DES manufacturer. See McCarty v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C82-
439T (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 1985).
With regard to local companies, the plaintiffs' lawyers, who are used to dealing with
the major companies, may consider it inefficient to go after a small company with whom
they have done no prior discovery.
68. Memorandum in Support of Defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. Motion to Dis-
miss at 14 (May 1, 1985), McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D.
Mass. 1985).
69. 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
70. Under the version of market share theory used in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,
102 Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 368, 383 (1984), the courts initially presume the defend-
ants to have equal shares of the relevant DES market, and the defendants may reduce
their potential liability by establishing their respective market shares in the relevant
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ery, as opposed to a complete recovery under an identification
theory, identification having been achieved through the due dili-
gence requirement, provides a sufficient incentive for the plain-
tiffs to investigate. In addition, the court argued, a verdict based
on identification would probably be more appealing to the aver-
age juror. 1
The McCormack court's reasoning was logical, but the court
neglected the possibility that the plaintiff will weigh the differ-
ence between market share and no recovery rather than market
share and identification recovery because she fears her identifi-
cation efforts will produce a judgment proof or otherwise unde-
sirable defendant. Furthermore, the court did not explain why a
plaintiff, knowing that market share is the law, would believe
that a juror would have any more difficulty handing down a
large award based on that theory rather than one based on iden-
tification theory.72
The court's discussion of due diligence also stated that be-
cause the "market-share theory relieves plaintiffs only of the
burden of proving causation in fact[,] . . .the evidence which
defendants fear will be negligently lost or purposely concealed,
will often be plaintiffs' only evidence of proximate cause and
damage. '7 3 However, because all the DES sold by the pharma-
ceutical companies used the same chemical formula, the ques-
tion of proximate cause has no relation to exactly whose DES
the plaintiff's mother ingested. Identification evidence relates to
proximate cause only to the extent that it is used to establish
area. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Squibb's
Motion to Dismiss at 5, McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass.
1985) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Memorandum in McCormack]. If a defendant can
prove its market by a preponderance of the evidence, it is only liable for its share of the
market as it relates to the total judgment. To the extent that other defendants fail to
establish their actual market share, their presumed market share is adjusted so that
100% of the market is accounted for. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 606, 689 P.2d at 383. If all
of the defendants can establish by a preponderance of the evidence their respective mar-
ket shares, the plaintiff will not recover her entire verdict, but rather an amount equal in
percentage to the sum of the defendants' market shares. Thus, if six defendants are sued,
and all six prove they each supplied only 10% of the DES in the relevant market, then
each is liable for only 10% of the judgment, and the plaintiff does not recover the re-
maining 40%. Plaintiff's Memorandum in McCormack, supra, at 5-6.
71. McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1528.
72. The McCormack court's arguments here would have no bearing in a jurisdiction
using a version of market share that did not employ the judgment reduction aspect of
Martin.
73. McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1529; see Memorandum and Order Re Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff Jacqueline Green, Anthony v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. 80-0556-S (D.R.I. Feb. 14, 1985) (summary judgment motion granted
against a plaintiff who could not produce a prima facie showing that the medication her
doctor prescribed was DES).
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that the mother actually took DES. Although the need to prove
this fact does create an incentive to look for the doctor's records,
it does not create an incentive to go any further in terms of sat-
isfying the due diligence requirement."'
III. THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD
No court has discussed in detail what actions the plaintiffs
must take in order to satisfy the due diligence requirement.75
This Part attempts to provide a general description of what due
diligence involves in the context of a DES case, though the exact
parameters of the due diligence requirement must be worked out
on a case-by-case basis.
The traditional due diligence standard has generally meant a
reasonable effort.7 6 The first court to apply due diligence to mar-
ket share theory interpreted it to require a variety of actions by
the plaintiffs and their attorneys.7 These actions included try-
ing to track down any of the doctors who treated the plaintiff's
mother, trying to find any of the pharmacists who operated the
pharmacy at which plaintiff's mother purchased the DES, and
trying to find any of the old pharmacy records, especially pre-
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-86 for a discussion of the actions a plaintiff
must take to satisfy this requirement.
75. For purposes of the diligence investigation, the term "plaintiff" should be con-
strued to include her attorneys and people working for them. The courts should not
expect the plaintiff herself to do as much as her attorneys. Nevertheless, the defendants
have argued that the plaintiffs themselves should have commenced some sort of investi-
gation as soon as they learned of their exposure to a hazardous substance, and one court
has agreed. See Memorandum of Upjohn on Due Diligence, supra note 57, at 9-11; Hear-
ing on Due Diligence, supra note 56, at 3-82. The court in Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim
of Janice Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976), did not describe what
the plaintiff should have done to be considered duly diligent because the plaintiff, claim-
ing the attorney-client privilege, refused to place the attorney who had originally inter-
viewed the plaintiff on the stand. The court indicated, however, that some inquiry would
have been appropriate, such as locating and deposing a doctor (deceased at the time of
the hearing) who had practiced with the prescribing doctor (also deceased) and inquiring
into the possibility of talking to jobbers and wholesalers to determine distribution prac-
tices of DES to pharmacies in the relevant area. See Hearing on Due Diligence, supra
note 56, at 3-83, 3-111, 3-112..
76. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (5th ed. 1970) ("Such a measure of prudence,
activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a
reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not measured by any
absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case.").
77. Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D.
Mass. filed 1976).
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scriptions, which might reveal how the relevant prescription was
filled.78
Given this standard, it seems reasonable to expect the plaintiff
in a DES case to ask her mother if she can remember any of the
physical characteristics of the pill she ingested. In addition, the
plaintiff should try to find out which pharmacy filled the pre-
scription. If the pharmacy is no longer in business, the plaintiff
should try to find out who the owners were 79 and then try to
locate them. The plaintiff should also try to find out if the phar-
macy, or its practice, was sold, and if so, to whom, because that
person may have information about the location of the phar-
macy's records. Furthermore, the plaintiff should try to visit the
pharmacy and check its storage area to see if any old records
still exist.
The plaintiff should also try to locate the wholesalers and job-
bers involved in the sale of DES in the relevant location at the
relevant time. They may provide information about the drug
companies from whom they purchased DES. The wholesalers,
moreover, may have information about the employees of the
pharmacy that could prove valuable in the investigation.
Finally, the plaintiff should attempt to locate her mother's
prescribing doctor. If he is deceased, the plaintiff should deter-
mine whether another doctor purchased his practice, and if so,
the plaintiff should try to find the other doctor to obtain
information.
The plaintiff may find some of these searches lead to dead
ends quickly; other inquiries may seem promising, but will gen-
erally require a huge amount of effort. In general, a plaintiff
should end any investigation of these areas when it is apparent
that future inquiry is either hopeless or will require a massive
expenditure of resources. Hence, the amount of productive in-
vestigation may vary widely from case to case. Because the defi-
nition of due diligence includes examining the "particular cir-
cumstances" 80 of the situation, the courts should not expect each
plaintiff to produce the same results.
Although the above description should be a sufficient starting
78. See Plaintiff's Statement Regarding Pharmacy Market Share, Product Identifica-
tion and Due Diligence at 3-7 (Apr. 19, 1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice
Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's
Statement Regarding Pharmacy Market Share].
79. This can be done through the state's Office of the Secretary of State. See Plain-
tiffs' Offer of Proof Re: Due Diligence at 2 (Dec. 6, 1984), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim
of Andrea Goldstein, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs'
Offer of Proof].
80. See supra note 76.
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point for determining the scope of the due diligence require-
ment, some disagreement may remain as to what will be consid-
ered a "reasonable effort." For example, in one statute of limita-
tions ruling, O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co,8 1 a plaintiff lost her
claim because the court held she had not been duly diligent in
determining that she had a claim that should have been filed.
The court held that the plaintiff was not duly diligent when ask-
ing her mother whether she had taken DES after the plaintiff
had read a magazine article in 1976 that described the medical
problems associated with DES. 2
Instead, the court held, the plaintiff should have called her
mother's doctor to verify her mother's story.83 The majority
found no reason for the plaintiff to wait until 1979 to call her
mother's doctor and found her explanation that she read some
new articles at that time to be insufficient.84 Thus, her claim was
barred. The dissent argued that the majority had articulated a
far higher requirement of diligence than could be rationally ex-
pected from a frightened teenager who learns for the first time
that she has cancer.8 5 The dissent reasoned that in this situation
the plaintiff could find her mother's initial denial sufficiently
credible.
O'Brien illustrates the difficulty of formulating precise
standards of due diligence. In light of this difficulty it seems best
to allow the courts to work such standards out on a case-by-case
basis."8
81. 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 707-08.
83. Id. at 710-11.
84. Id. at 710.
85. Id. at 713 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
86. One defendant has argued that the courts should impose a strict standard of due
diligence because if plaintiffs need only perform some cursory questioning of a few wit-
nesses, then the plaintiff who pays lip service to the due diligence requirement might be
allowed to pursue a market share claim against several defendants when, with a little
more effort, she could have identified the true tortfeasor. Unless the courts require an
extensive search, a plaintiff might consider performing only a perfunctory search, then
declare that she has no knowledge of the identity of the drug company which made the
DES to which she was exposed in utero. Memorandum of Upjohn on Due Diligence,
supra note 57, at 4.
Although the above argument has some merit, an important consideration in these
cases is that the plaintiffs have far less resources than the defendants. To expect them to
perform an investigation comparable to that of the defendants denies the fact that the
defendants have much more money, time, and manpower than the plaintiffs. In addition,
the defendants can spend their superior resources developing sophisticated investigative
techniques. (The fact that the defendants have superior resources does not change the
fact that plaintiffs are initially in a better position in terms of where to begin the investi-
gation, see supra text accompanying notes 64-65.) However, once the defendants have
deposed the plaintiff and her mother, the former can commence an investigation com-
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IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT
The application of the due diligence requirement to market
share theory has been objected to as requiring plaintiffs to en-
gage in a useless search during which nothing will be found, as
preventing the use of class actions, and as an invasion of the
attorney-client privilege. An examination of these objections will
reveal that they do not merit a rejection of the due diligence
requirement.
A. Due Diligence Will Require a Useless Search
A major objection to the application of due diligence is the
claim that it will require plaintiffs to conduct a useless search.
Because so many of the records have been destroyed, so many of
the potential witnesses have passed away, and so many memo-
ries have faded,'87 the McCormack court argued that the due dili-
mensurate with their resources. Accordingly, it would not be fair for the defendants to
launch a massive investigation for evidence, find something, then claim that the plain-
tiffs were not duly diligent because they did not find it. For example, in one case, the
defendants located the building which had housed the plaintiff's pharmacy in a deterio-
rating neighborhood. The defendant's detective searched inside the building and in the
basement he found old records still intact relating to the pharmacy. Supplemental Writ-
ten Offer of Proof by Defendant Eli Lilly and Company on the Failure of Plaintiffs to
Establish the Prerequisites to Alternative Liability, Market Share Liability, or Any
Other Non-Idenification Theory of Liability at 3-4 (Jan. 9, 1985), Payton v. Abbott
Labs, Claim of Andrea Goldstein, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976). Further inquiry,
however, revealed that the relevant records were probably destroyed two years after the
plaintiff filed her lawsuit. Id. at 3.
The plaintiff's attorneys stated that they learned the store had been abandoned and
that there had been radical changes in the neighborhood. Plaintiffs' Offer of Proof, supra
note 79, at 4. In addition, the plaintiff's attorneys had contacted a prior owner of the
pharmacy who said the basement had flooded several times. Id. at 7. It is possible that
the plaintiffs did not investigate the pharmacy further because they judged that their
limited resources would be better spent elsewhere. Attorneys in such circumstances
probably work on a contingent fee and must judge carefully how much money should be
allocated each DES plaintiff. The defendants, on the other hand, can probably afford to
have a lawyer and detective working full time. Thus, it might be fair to find the plaintiffs
duly diligent even though they did not get into the basement of the building and find the
records because doing so would have required more than a reasonable effort in this par-
ticular case.
It should be noted that even though the plaintiffs would not be required to examine
the basement they would be expected to do so if the building appeared more accessible.
In this case, the fact that the defendant did not discover that potentially relevant
records had been destroyed until a week or two before trial indicates the magnitude of
the defendant's effort. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Trial Issues, supra note 65, at 9-
11.
87. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (neither the
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gence requirement will do nothing but add unnecessary litiga-
tion costs-" Yet several of the DES cases reveal that a plaintiff's
vigorous investigation might be successful in identifying the de-
fendant. Such an investigation might profitably explore several
different areas.
First, although many pharmacy records might be difficult to
find, locating them is not impossible. Many of the pharmacies
operating in the 1950's may still be in business. Although the
general policy of these businesses is to discard old prescriptions
after five years, many pharmacists have not followed that prac-
tice." Thus, it can never be said for certain that old records
have been destroyed. Furthermore, even if the pharma'cy has
gone out of business, the owners may have sold their practice to
a competitor, who may have retained the records.90 If the plain-
tiff can find her prescription, that document should tell her with
whose DES the pharmacist filled it. Even if the prescription is
not available, other records might provide some circumstantial
evidence.
Second, the pharmacy's DES purchasing patterns may be a
useful area to explore. Often a pharmacy will purchase a particu-
lar drug in a regular fashion, borrowing from neighboring phar-
macies when necessary. If the plaintiff can obtain information
about these purchasing and borrowing practices from the phar-
macists or the wholesalers who supplied them, the plaintiffs may
be able to develop an identification case against a man-
ufacturer."1
plaintiff's mother nor any of her doctors could remember any of the characteristics of the
DES she ingested, and the pharmacists involved in providing the prescriptions could not
produce any records because the records had been destroyed).
88. McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1529 (D. Mass. 1985):
[W]e decline to impose a requirement that would, in many situations[,J lead to
empty allegations by plaintiffs and time-consuming, often fruitless inquiries by
courts.
... Requiring a plaintiff to allege and prove due diligence is, in essence, re-
quiring her to explain what can already be presumed: the plaintiff has no cause
of action under traditional standards of liability.
89. See supra note 86 (describing the location of old records in an abandoned phar-
macy's basement).
90. See Plaintiff's Statement Regarding Pharmacy Market Share, supra note 78, at 6.
Although the plaintiff claimed the purchasing pharmacy disposed of the records "shortly
after it got possession of them," id., that may not have been a standard practice when
pharmacy businesses were purchased.
91. For example, in one case, on an identification theory against Eli Lilly & Co., the
plaintiff was able to get to the jury using the following inferences: that her mother
remembered using a generic prescription for a certain dose pill, that the relevant phar-
macy generally ordered that dosage DES pill from its main wholesaler as an open order,
and that the wholesaler had a policy to fill such orders with Lilly products. Plaintiff-
Appellee Reply Brief at 35, Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Andrea Goldstein, No. 76-
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Third, even if she cannot provide enough evidence to produce
an identification, the plaintiff may be able to recover under a
subtheory of market share called "pharmacy market share." Ac-
cording to this theory, the named defendants who are shown to
have sold their product to the pharmacy at which the plaintiff's
mother purchased her DES are each held liable in proportion to
their share of that pharmacy's DES sales. °" This form of market
share theory eliminates many defendants and limits the possibil-
ity of liability to only a few, thus approximating more closely the
ideal of identification. The plaintiff can use pharmacy market
share theory only when she has conducted a thorough investiga-
tion to find out where the drugs were purchased and who sup-
plied the pharmacy.
Finally, the physical characteristics of the DES itself may be
helpful in identification efforts. Although many of the companies
did market DES generically,9 3 several major firms produced pills
of varying color, shape, and composition. " To the extent that
the plaintiff's mother can remember the characteristics of the
pill she ingested, that information can be used to narrow down
the number of possible defendants.9
1514-S (D. Mass. filed 1976). The validity of the jury's inference of causation from this
series of facts was upheld on appeal in Payton v. Abbott Labs, 780 F.2d 147, 157-58 (1st
Cir. 1985). Therefore, this type of evidence may be available and result in positive
identification.
92. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Apply the Principle of Al-
ternative Liability or, in the Alternative, the Principle of "Pharmacy" Market Share at
34-36 (Oct. 18, 1984), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Andrea Goldstein, No. 76-1514-S
(D. Mass. filed 1976).
93. Note, supra note 6, at 670.
94. See DRUG Topics RED BOOK 159-60 (1954 ed.) (listing the Upjohn Company as
marketing, in varying dosages, green, blue, purple, and violet perles (liquid-filled cap-
sules) of DES, and Massengil as selling yellow, green, orange, red, and purple tablets).
But cf. Plaintiff's Memorandum in McCormack, supra note 70, at 9 (arguing all DES
pills were "indistinguishable from each other in size, shape, smell, and texture").
In fact, for several years, the pharmaceutical companies insisted that they make their
pills available to the courts under a protective order without making them available to
opposing counsel. The companies wanted to ensure that plaintiffs' lawyers would not
show the pills to plaintiff's mothers, who might then "refresh" their memories as to the
characteristics of the pill they ingested. Hearing on Due Diligence, supra note 56, at 3-
84, 3-85.
95. For example, in one case, a defendant argued that a pharmacist informed plain-
tiff's counsel that the relevant pharmacy carried only red and white DES and did not
carry any kind of "capsulated" DES, which would mean that the pharmacy could not
carry any of that defendant's DES, all of which was capsulated. Memorandum of Upjohn
on Due Diligence, supra note 57, at 11.
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B. Class Actions
A further objection to the application of a due diligence re-
quirement to market share theory is that it would make the use
of class actions impossible.96 However, class actions are not use-
ful devices in the context of DES litigation, whether or not due
diligence is imposed. For example, although a federal judge in
Boston certified a 3,800 member DES class action9 7 against the
major manufacturers, he later had to decertify it,98 in part be-
cause the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts emphasized
the importance of allowing individual defendants to offer excul-
patory evidence against each plaintiff.
The primary reason that class actions are not appropriate for
DES litigation is that the major defendants in DES cases pos-
sess a significant amount of exculpatory evidence regarding spe-
cific causation, due to the differing physical characteristics of
their DES. This makes class actions difficult, if not impossible,
because each defendant would have this evidence available to
offer against each plaintiff whose mother can remember any-
thing about the pill she ingested. Thus, most defendants would
be liable only to certain plaintiffs, which would destroy the com-
monality of questions of law and fact necessary for a class ac-
tion.99 Because, therefore, class actions in DES cases are made
ineffective by factors unrelated to the due diligence requirement,
it is not persuasive to argue against the due diligence require-
ment on the ground that it interferes with the use of class
actions.
96. See Note, supra note 6, at 675 (the application of market share to DES cases is
particularly useful because it would facilitate the use of class actions, so that a large
number of plaintiffs could receive compensation from a large number of defendants
without the necessity of the assignment of individual liability). To make each plaintiff
search for identification evidence and to make those who can identify their defendant
proceed using traditional tort theory would destroy the commonality of questions of law
and fact necessary for a class action. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
97. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 386-87 (D. Mass. 1979) (class action condi-
tionally certified, allowing for the resolution of thirteen questions of law by means of
certification of an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts).
98. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 100 F.R.D. 336, 340 (D. Mass. 1983).
99. In fact, the judge who originally certified the class action later noted that "the
impression I received from plaintiffs' counsel" when the class action case was first
presented was that "DES was fungible, uniform in appearance and flowed into the mar-
ket without differentiation by manufacturer.... That does not appear to be the typical
situation. In the typical situation, the inquiry narrows down to one or two drug stores
and pills that are differentiated in size, shape and color." Memorandum Concerning
Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, supra note 16, at 3.
For another serious problem with DES class actions, see Mertens v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983) (questions of proximate cause for each plaintiff override
common questions); accord Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979).
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The same factors that make class actions ineffective also
render unworkable a market share theory that eliminates any
possibility of exculpation or individual defendant identification.
One author has argued to the contrary, noting that some deserv-
ing plaintiffs might not be able to recover under traditional mar-
ket share theory because their manufacturers are judgment
proof. Thus, this author argues, market share theory should not
require efforts by the plaintiff to identify the defendant who ac-
tually caused her injury.100 Rather, a plaintiff should be allowed
to sue as if it were impossible to identify her particular manu-
facturer. Although some defendants would be forced to pay
more than their share of the damages, courts could justify this
as a type of social cost spreading. 101 In addition, allowing this
recovery would avoid expensive litigation to determine whether
a particular plaintiff is knowing or unknowing.
Admittedly, this theory might provide a more efficient way of
assessing damages because no time or money would be devoted
to identification or exculpation efforts. It is questionable, how-
ever, whether it is fair to hold a company liable for damages
even though that company can show it did not cause them, and
no state court has ever considered this version of market share
theory. Two important premises of Sindell, and the variations
other state courts have developed from it, are that market share
liability should be used only when identification efforts fail01
and that no defendant should pay for any damages it can prove
it did not cause. 03 Whether or not this alternative method is
more efficient, it is beyond the scope of this Note to advocate a
change in law that no state court has accepted, let alone dis-
cussed. The purpose of this Note is to show how existing market
share theory can be made more coherent, not to develop a com-
pletely new doctrine.10 4
100. Note, supra note 6, at 676.
101. Id. This type of market share would resemble a trust fund; see id. at 675 n.43.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
103. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166,
197-98, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984).
104. Admittedly, the use of market share theory with due diligence and exculpation
may arguably create some injustices. For example, a duly diligent plaintiff who finds a
judgment proof manufacturer would not be given any recovery. But because the major
companies occupied such a large percentage of the market-i.e., the six major ones sued
in Sindell alleged by plaintiffs to have 90%-this injustice should not happen often. See
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Furthermore, this injustice would not be caused
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C. Due Diligence as an Unreasonable Burden upon the
Plaintiffs
Due diligence has been criticized for imposing an unreasona-
ble imposition on DES plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have argued that be-
cause they were in utero when they were exposed to DES, with
no control over their exposure or the lapse in time between the
exposure and the manifestation of their medical problems, they
should not have any unnecessary burdens placed upon them. 10 5
While it is true that DES plaintiffs are not at fault for their
injuries or their difficulties in identifying the proper defendant,
the fact that they have not been contributorily negligent does
not mean that the courts should relieve them of the burden of
proving the necessary elements of their suit. The need to iden-
tify the proper defendant is important because market share
theory is a theory of last resort. The due diligence requirement
is necessary to ensure that the proper defendant is identified, if
possible. Thus, it is in no way an unnecessary burden. Moreover,
because the due diligence inquiry requires only a reasonable ef-
fort, there is no reason to relieve the plaintiffs of this
responsibility.
D. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine
Another objection to the due diligence requirement is that it
invades the attorney-client and work product privileges.106
Plaintiffs contend that the type of information needed to iden-
tify a defendant is privileged and that they should not be re-
quired to reveal it.
Producing evidence for a due diligence hearing, however, will
not require any breach of the attorney-client privilege. The rele-
by a problem specific to the DES litigation, but rather by the more general problem of
culpable defendants who are bankrupt. It is beyond the scope of present market share
theory to solve that problem as well as the problem of identification.
In addition, although plaintiffs' attorneys may consider it inefficient to sue a small
company of which they know little rather than a large one with which they have dealt
frequently, that difficulty should not justify holding the larger company liable if it can
prove it did not manufacture the relevant DES.
105. See Plaintiff's Memorandum Concerning Standard of Due Diligence at 3-4 (May
28, 1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D.
Mass. filed 1976).
106. Preservation of Plaintiff's Objections Regarding Due Diligence at 2 (May 28,
1985), Payton v. Abbott Labs, Claim of Janice Cohen Garfinkle, No. 76-1514-S (D. Mass.
filed 1976).
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vant Revised Uniform Evidence Rule states that "[a] client has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the pur-
pose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to
the client."'1 7 Exchanges of legal advice are not involved in the
due diligence inquiry, so those communications would not be
disclosed. Rather, the inquiry would concern what actions had
been taken by the attorneys, presumably in reaction to what the
plaintiffs told them about their DES exposure. 108 Thus, the in-
quiry would reveal whether routine factual investigation into an
issue of obvious importance was carried out.'0 9
Although statements made for the purpose of facilitating pro-
fessional legal services might be of importance when, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff first tells the attorney what she knows about
the DES she took, the issue for inquiry would be not the con-
tents of the conversation, but rather whether it had taken place
at all, and what the attorney's response was to it."0
Nor will the due diligence requirement violate the related doc-
trine of the work product privilege. In this area, the standards
from Hickman v. Taylor"' are controlling. In Hickman the Su-
preme Court held that relevant and nonprivileged facts, where
essential to another party's case, are not protected by the work
product doctrine."' In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b) states that the judge, in ordering discovery of protected
materials, is directed to "protect against disclosure of the men-
tal impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney.""113
Initially, it is difficult to see just how the work product doc-
trine applies to any documents related to a due diligence investi-
107. REV. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (1974). While this is only a proposed rule, it reflects
the generally accepted common law in the area. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 206 (3d ed.
1984).
108. Memorandum of Eli Lilly on Due Diligence, supra note 62, at 9 n.5 ("[Tihe
fruits of such investigations are clearly discoverable and the investigation would itself be
framed to produce admissible evidence.").
109. Id.
110. The plaintiff's demonstration here is basically not different from an attorney's
showing that he has complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That
rule requires a reasonable amount of investigation prior to the filing of a claim to ensure
that it has colorable merit and has been made in good faith. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and
advisory committee notes. The advisory committee notes to this Rule make it clear that
if the plaintiff feels he must disclose privileged documents to show the. claim is substan-
tially justified, he can use protective orders, after in camera inspection by the court, to
maintain the privilege.
111. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
112. Id. at 511.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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gation. Because the scope of the documents would be limited to
the due diligence inquiry, none of the plaintiffs strategies would
be revealed through these records. The work product doctrine
prevents opposing parties from obtaining an advantage by
claiming they need to see documents which actually give away a
plaintiff's strategic position. A description of a plaintiff's unsuc-
cessful attempts to identify the manufacturer should not have
any bearing on strategy.
CONCLUSION
The theory of market share has not been accepted with a
great deal of enthusiasm by state appellate courts. 14 The appli-
cation of a due diligence requirement, however, may lead to
greater acceptance by the courts because such a requirement
furthers the objectives of both plaintiffs and defendants with re-
gard to market share theory. The plaintiffs may be more suc-
cessful in their efforts to get market share theory accepted by
state appellate courts if they can show that all other possibilities
of providing relief have been exhausted." 5 Likewise, the defend-
ants should welcome the due diligence requirement because it
discourages plaintiffs in market share jurisdictions from indis-
criminately suing a large number of companies, pleading igno-
rance, and leaving it to the companies to exculpate themselves.
In terms of its conceptual relation to market share theory, the
due diligence requirement explains why the burden of investiga-
tion must be shouldered by the defendants when market share
theory is used. As a theory of last resort, market share should be
seen as relieving the plaintiff of the burdens of production and
persuasion with regard to specific defendant identification, pro-
vided plaintiffs have shown they have done everything they pos-
sibly can to meet that burden themselves. Because plaintiffs are
originally in a better position to discover identification evidence,
moreover, the due diligence requirement, by compelling plain-
114. Comment, supra note 5, at 144-45, 148 ("Market share liability has been re-
jected by most courts as an ill-conceived solution based on policy grounds, not legal
precedent. Furthermore, these same courts have not yet adopted either a single legal
theory or a consistent set of standards to apply in latent, mass-injury cases.").
115. See Memorandum Concerning Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, supra note 16, at
2 (due diligence "provides a desirable brake on the wholesale abandonment of traditional
grounds for liability and is therefore consistent with the viewpoint of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court").
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tiffs to do the initial investigation, enhances the efficiency of the
investigative process.
Thus, imposing a due diligence requirement in market share
theory would make it more compatible with traditional theories
of liability. The due diligence requirement would also provide a
degree of fairness to defendants which is vital in a theory aban-
doning the long-established causation requirement of traditional
tort law.
-Thomas C. Willcox
